Naval War College Review
Volume 57
Number 1 Winter

Article 18

2004

Book Reviews
The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
War College, The U.S. Naval (2004) "Book Reviews," Naval War College Review: Vol. 57 : No. 1 , Article 18.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/18

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

A PARADIGM SHIFT
Barnett, Roger W. Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power. Brassey’s, 2003. 176pp. $39.95

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
cacophony of voices arose (mostly from
the conservative wing of the Republican
Party) asserting that the United States was
in danger of being eclipsed by the Soviet
Union. In short, the argument was “the
sky is falling.” President Reagan used the
issue to great advantage during the
1980 presidential campaign, setting
the stage for a massive increase in defense expenditures and the launching
of the ambitious “Star Wars” program, the forerunner of the Clinton and
Bush administrations’ attempt to build
a national missile defense system. It
turned out that Soviet power had been
exaggerated and that our own political,
intellectual, and ideological predispositions had blinded us to signs of the impending implosion of the Soviet system.
Interestingly, it could be argued that
however misguided the Reagan defense
buildup might have been vis-à-vis its
principal objective, programs launched
during that era set us on the path that
today has resulted in an unprecedented
global conventional military superiority
that we see manifested today in battlefields around the world.
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Today, there are new arguments that
the sky is falling, that the global security
environment has undergone profound
and even revolutionary change, and
that the United States remains woefully
unprepared to deal with the threats
posed by a new caste of diabolical adversaries boasting new and dangerous
capabilities. Roger Barnett’s Asymmetrical Warfare could be regarded as a bible
for those interested in exploring the implications of such a thesis. Like proponents of arguments advanced in the
early 1980s, Barnett, professor emeritus
at the Naval War College, believes that
the United States has never been more
vulnerable and must take drastic steps
to avert an impending catastrophe. Today’s security environment, aptly and
eloquently described in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States of America, is
characterized by undeterred rogue
states and transnational terrorist organizations with access to new weapons
that can inflict mass casualties on an
unprecedented scale. Barnett argues
that the new environment represents a
fundamental departure, or paradigm
shift, in that there are no longer any
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behavioral constraints on those seeking
to attack the United States. In short, the
international order stands at the precipice, if it has not already descended into
the Hobbesian state of nature.
Barnett argues that a series of mutually
supporting, and damaging, constraints—
moral, political, organizational, legal,
and operational—developed over the
second half of the twentieth century
and are now conspiring to subvert the
ability of the United States to use force
as a tool to manage the new security environment. He argues that the United
States is fundamentally in a strategically
defensive posture, thereby ceding the
initiative to its adversaries and making
it vulnerable to the kinds of surprise attacks that happened on 9/11. This
means that “the United States has,
without malice and forethought, backed
unwittingly into the situation where it
resembles the mighty Gulliver, cinched
down by Lilliputian strings.”
Barnett believes that these limitations
on using force have effectively created a
“breeding ground” for asymmetrical actions by adversaries under no moral or
political limits, who in fact perceive
these constraints as signs of weakness.
Throughout the history of warfare, participants have always sought to exploit
an opponent’s weaknesses, but Barnett
posits that asymmetric warfare today
constitutes something new and different—war and conflict without limits. In
other words, we are not talking about
adversaries advancing creative ideas on
asymmetric warfare like those developed during the 1930s by the Billy
Mitchells and Heinz Guderians of the
world, which eventually revolutionized conventional military warfare.
Today’s adversaries are bent on mass
destruction using any means at their
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disposal—nuclear, chemical, biological,
and cyberspace.
Barnett’s description of the international environment seems apt enough,
if a bit dire, and his discussion of the
various constraints is interesting and
contains some good and useful points.
He is right to point out that moral and
legal constraints have assumed great
importance in the conduct of military
operations. Such issues as collateral
damage, the idea of proportionality in
using force, and the perpetration of the
myth that the American people have an
aversion to taking casualties have all affected the decision-making process on
when and if the country should use
force. As for the country’s decision
making on using force, Barnett rightly
criticizes the haphazard series of interactions between various governmental
bureaucracies and the executive and
legislative branches as a discombobulated process that can be manipulated
and exploited by sophisticated adversaries. He is also right to point out that
the United Nations has proven to be
only marginally successful in managing
new threats to security in the international environment and that the successive surrendering of authority to the
international body under various treaties has constrained some capabilities
that could conceivably be useful for deterrence and operational use. Barnett’s
prescription to address the problem is
useful, suggesting that the United States
undertake a systematic review of circumstances under which the nation will
use force and be prepared to declare
war, and make these circumstances
widely known to its adversaries.
However, like those who declared that
the sky was falling in the 1980s, one
cannot help feeling that Barnett has
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overdramatized the situation. While the
9/11 attacks created a cottage industry
of sorts describing a supposedly new
and dangerous security environment,
the toppling of the World Trade Center
towers needs to be seen in the context
of a pattern of increasingly bold attacks
on the United States that arguably
stretch back to the 1980s, when the first
hostages were taken in Lebanon. One of
the surprising things about the attacks
was that they were a surprise at all. After all, Ramzi Youssef came closer than
is generally appreciated to bringing
down the towers in 1995; the Khobar
Towers attack in 1996 resulted in a dramatic change in U.S. security posture in
the Persian Gulf; and the United States
had already returned fire with al-Qa‘ida
following the August 1988 embassy attacks. Over this twenty-odd-year period,
America adjusted and took a variety of
steps, mostly at the operational and organizational levels, that helped create
the special operations capabilities that
are now being deployed around the
world in the so-called global war on
terrorism. Homeland defense is now a
priority, seeing the creation of a new
cabinet secretary and department to coordinate efforts at the federal, state, and
local levels.
While Barnett decries the irrelevance of
the United Nations in the new environment, the global war on terror is in fact
taking place within an internationally
sanctioned legal framework that requires all states to take necessary steps
to combat terrorism, including the use
of force. While the United Nations has
proven less successful in addressing
threats posed by rogue states, UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (passed
after 9/11) provides a useful and interesting template that requires global
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cooperation against the very threat
Barnett argues is a principal source of
evil in the international system. It is
hard to see that it is anything other
than a useful tool for marshaling a
global cooperative effort against
terrorism.
Moreover, while it is true that the
United States operates under a number
of constraints when using force, today’s
global military deployments around the
world simply belie Barnett’s contention
that the United States remains hamstrung in using force as a tool to manage the international environment. If
anything, it would appear that efforts
over the last twenty years have positioned America quite well to go after its
adversaries in all four corners of the
globe, and that the attacks of 9/11 created the political environment for decision makers to use force aggressively to
address perceived threats. While
Barnett asserts the necessity of a more
systematic and commonsensical process
for deciding when to use force, events
indicate that we are not doing too badly
on that front. As for a new declaratory
policy spelling out when the country
will use force, any adversary could read
the Bush administration’s national security strategy report and get a good
idea of the nation’s intolerance for directly threatening the United States.
On a stylistic note, Asymmetrical Warfare
at times reads like a legal brief, and it
gives the impression that the author simply searched for arguments supporting
his thesis and consciously ignored any
contradictory evidence or points of view.
Some parts of the text simply consist of a
series of long, strung-together quotes
by other authors, making for heavy
going. The extent to which the author
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repeats his arguments in successive
chapters is also somewhat irritating.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the
book provides an extremely interesting
and thought-provoking argument that is
cogently expressed in a well organized
work. Barnett has produced a useful
and positive contribution to the ongoing revitalization of the field of strategy
and to the associated debate surrounding the use of force in the international
environment. Students and professors
interested in security strategy in the
new century should add this work to
their libraries.
JAMES A. RUSSELL

Naval Postgraduate School

Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 360pp. $34.95

This well researched and clearly written
study of U.S. combat with Libya in the
1980s has important echoes for today’s
policy makers. It begins with a quick
look at America’s first war with a Muslim state—in the nineteenth century,
when the U.S. Navy fought viciously
with the Barbary pirates off the coast of
North Africa. It then traces the rise of
one of the Barbary pirates’ direct
descendants—the well known latetwentieth-century practitioner of state
terrorism Muammar Qaddafi of
Libya. Throughout the book Joseph
Stanik, professor of history and retired
naval officer, provides detailed accounts
of the 1980 key attacks and a well reasoned analysis of their political impact.
There is, of course, particularly well
documented material covering the
key air strike of 15 April 1986, which
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was a devastating blow against
Qaddafi’s regime and changed his approach profoundly.
For those of us on active service in the
1980s, the battles with Libya seemed a
bit of a sideshow when compared to the
main dance of the Cold War. Yet this
relatively short, bitter conflict was actually a harbinger of things to come.
Much as today’s terrorists seek to influence global events through individual
attacks, Qaddafi sought to drive the
course of world activity through
bombings and state-sponsored terrorism. The Reagan administration at
first responded with rhetoric, but it
eventually became clear that more
forceful action would be needed.
It is interesting, in this time of “global
war on terrorism,” to look back to the
1980s and realize that this is a war that
began long before 9/11. President Reagan
was elected in no small measure in response to the state-condoned terrorism
of Iran, where radical students had held
American diplomats hostage for 444
days before Reagan’s election, releasing
them just after his inauguration. Over
the next five years, a series of dramatic
terrorist incidents followed—bombings
and killings in Lebanon, including the
horrific truck-bomb attack on the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over
two hundred Marines in a single moment; the murder of Marine embassy
guards in El Salvador; the hijacking of
major airliners and the killing of hostages, including a U.S. Navy SEAL,
Robert Stethem; airport killings in Rome
and Vienna; and the dramatic disco
bombing in Berlin. Clearly, the United
States had to respond, so in the spring
of 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON
sent a clear and dramatic message to
Muammar Qaddafi, with telling results.
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Beginning in the 1970s with territorial
claims that the Gulf of Sidra was actually within Libyan internal waters,
Qaddafi had plotted a collision course
with the United States. For over two decades he attempted to use Libya’s oil
wealth to undermine moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa,
sought weapons of mass destruction,
and developed a national foreign policy
that incorporated the use of terrorism
to achieve his objectives.
This is a story painted on a global canvas, from the 1986 La Belle Disco
bombing in West Berlin, which killed
U.S. servicemen, to the ghastly destruction of a global war on terrorism.
El Dorado Canyon is a fine case study in
combating terrorism and deserves a
place on the shelf of anyone interested
in America’s current conflict, as well as
the history of U.S. Navy involvement
in combat.
JAMES STAVRIDIS

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space: From
the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-centric Warfare.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
384pp. $36.95

This work examines the development of
space systems and its implications for
naval warfare in the twenty-first century
by focusing on the argument that “access
to space systems makes possible a new
style of warfare.” It addresses the “linked
revolution of long-range missiles and
their space-based supporting systems.”
Furthermore, Friedman seeks to understand how the development of spacebased systems (notably rockets and
satellites) has radically influenced how

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004

139

naval forces conduct navigation,
communication, reconnaissance, and
targeting. The reality is that modern
military forces depend almost entirely
on platforms in space to know where
they are and to communicate with
friendly forces, as well as to know the
location of enemy forces and use that
information to destroy them. This “revolution in military affairs” is now having an effect on a global scale.
None of these observations, however, is
particularly new, and in fact all have
been widely discussed within the defense establishment since the Persian
Gulf War, when it became evident that
U.S. military forces depend to a unique
and unparalleled degree on constellations of satellites. Such technologies as
the Global Positioning System (GPS)
became familiar in the public debate
about national security in the early 1990s
with reports that U.S. soldiers used commercially purchased GPS receivers to
navigate across Iraq’s featureless desert.
In addition, the images broadcast globally of Scud missiles landing in Saudi
Arabia and Israel reinforced the reliance on space-based systems to warn of
impending attacks. Nor have we forgotten the failure of coalition forces
during the Persian Gulf War to find
Iraqi Scud missiles in what were called
“Scud hunts.”
What is interesting and noteworthy
about Friedman’s work is its focus on
the fact that the development of these
space systems has profound implications
for the nature and conduct of maritime
operations. In 2004, naval forces can
know exactly where they are in the middle of vast oceans; communicate with
their counterparts anywhere on the
globe; scan entire oceans or land masses
for targets in relatively short order;
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and use precision-guided munitions,
such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, to
destroy them. Not surprisingly, the
combination of space-based systems
has significantly improved U.S. maritime as well as military capabilities.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of
Friedman’s work is the sheer volume of
data that it contains. The reader is led
through discussions of the development
of space launchers, including detailed
reviews of the U.S. and Soviet programs. Friedman is quite comfortable
discussing the development of these
technologies and thus easily examines
how the United States has integrated
space technologies into everyday military operations. This descriptive material is quite useful for those not familiar
with many of the technologies and capabilities that exist under the rubric of
space systems. The central value of
Seapower and Space is to help the reader
understand the technological and operational forces that have changed how
the U.S. defense establishment, most
notably its naval component, goes
about its business.
All told, Friedman’s work is useful because of its breadth and depth. Yet in
many chapters the analytic foundations
of the work are obscured by the exceptionally detailed discussions of the evolution of, for example, rocket programs,
communications systems, satellite programs, and cruise missile programs, to
name a few. For readers who are more
interested in how space systems support
maritime operations, these details
prove somewhat distracting.
How, then, should we judge the value
of Friedman’s work? The overall quality
of the research and writing speaks for
itself. The chapters are tightly organized
and lucid, which reaffirms that the
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author is knowledgeable about naval
matters. This is a useful work that by
contributing to the literature on the relationship between space and naval operations exposes the reader to a wide
range of systems and technologies that
are fundamental to the capabilities possessed by modern navies and military
forces. As a history of space and maritime systems, it contributes new and
useful particulars, background, and insights into how space systems help the
naval commanders. My only wish is
that he could have focused less on programmatic details. That being said,
Friedman’s work represents an important step toward analyzing how space
represents the next set of technologies
that will revolutionize naval operations
in the future.
WILLIAM C. MARTEL

Naval War College

Lim, Robyn. The Geopolitics of East Asia: The
Search for Equilibrium. New York: Routledge
Curzon, 2003. 208pp. $90
Kane, Thomas M. Chinese Grand Strategy and
Maritime Power. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2002.
158pp. $55

One of the most intriguing questions
about the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) today is whether its communist
government does or does not have the
“ambition” to acquire a blue-water
navy. If building an oceangoing fleet
is among Beijing’s long-term goals,
then China may one day become a dangerous peer competitor of the United
States. If so, a future Sino-U.S. maritime conflict is possible; if not, Washington’s primarily maritime power and
Beijing’s primarily continental power
need never meet in battle.
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The two books discussed here focus on
different aspects of China and so answer this question in radically different
ways. Robyn Lim examines Far Eastern
geopolitics and history to address the
issue of Sino-U.S. conflict. Focusing on
the numerous twentieth-century wars
fought among the East Asian quadrilateral—the United States, China, Japan,
and Russia—Lim concludes that a new
“great-power war” is “thinkable” and
that such a conflict would probably be
maritime in nature: “If China, a rising
continental power, is indeed seeking
domination over East Asia and its contiguous waters, this pattern of conflict
is set to continue—because the United
States, with its own maritime security at
stake, is bound to stand in China’s way.”

Tokyo, be prepared to stop a PRC attack on Taiwan, dampen the rising
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and
redirect future Chinese maritime expansion into more peaceful directions.
Lim cautions that too strident a policy
might push China into a corner, leading to irrational decisions on Beijing’s
part—much as Washington’s 1941 failure to deter Tokyo resulted in the miscalculated decision to attack Pearl
Harbor. However, Lim concludes that
in the coming years a certain degree of
great-power conflict will probably be
unavoidable, since “when China
started to demonstrate blue water
ambition, it was certain to collide with
America’s interest as the global ‘offshore balancer.’ ”

The underlying reason for a possible future Sino-U.S. conflict, says Lim, is Japan’s defeat in World War II, coupled
with the Soviet Union’s collapse in
1991. Not only has Russia’s precipitous
decline given China “strategic latitude
unprecedented in modern times,” but
the waning security threat along the
Sino-Russian border has allowed
Beijing to point “east and south strategically, pressing on the vital straits that
connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”
In light of Russia’s decision to sell massive amounts of military equipment—
dominated by ships, planes, and naval
weaponry—to China, possible SinoU.S. flashpoints include a PRC invasion
or blockade of Taiwan, international
conflict on the Korean Peninsula, maritime tensions with Japan over the
Senkaku (in Chinese, Diaoyutai) Islands, and Southeast Asian resistance to
China’s self-proclaimed sovereignty
over the South China Sea.

Thomas Kane examines the future of
China’s navy in Chinese Grand Strategy
and Maritime Power. Studying the history of Chinese grand strategy, which
has most recently included calls for
the creation of a “new order” among
the world’s great states, Kane concludes that “if China wishes to claim a
leading role in international politics, it
must become a seapower,” which
means, in turn, that “maritime development is one of the most prominent
and most challenging goals of the
PRC’s [grand] strategy.”

To offset such a conflict, Washington
must ally itself even more closely with
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To support his point, Kane argues that
for thousands of years the Chinese were
among the world’s great practitioners
of seapower. From the sixteenth to the
mid-twentieth century, however,
China’s navy stagnated, only to be born
anew during the 1950s, when Mao
Zedong proclaimed that China should
develop a strong fleet. In 1979, Deng
Xiaoping helped to make Mao’s dream
a reality, redirecting an ever larger share
of the defense budget to the People’s
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Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Not
only was a strong navy necessary to exploit maritime resources in the surrounding seas, including enormous
reserves of fish, oil, and natural gas, but
“until the Chinese have an oceangoing
navy, their freedom to trade will depend upon the goodwill of others.
China’s leaders understand this fact,
and are determined to remedy it.”
During the twenty-first century, the
Chinese navy is bound to grow. It is no
match for the U.S. Navy, but Kane cautions that just because “China’s navy
remains materially weak does not mean
that it is strategically useless.” In fact,
the PLAN is clearly “designed to serve a
purpose in war,” and if “one reflects
upon how China’s navy measures up to
the tasks Beijing is putting it to, and
combines those reflections with a consideration of how the Chinese fleet may
develop over time, the PLAN begins to
seem more adequate.”
China’s primary strategic goals include
coastal defense, intimidation of Taiwan,
and the gradual expansion of Chinese
power southward into the South China
Sea. In recent years, the PLAN has begun
to acquire the naval equipment necessary to achieve these limited goals. In
particular, Kane notes the rapid increase
in China’s mine warfare capability: “As
of the year 2000, almost 90 percent of
the major ships in China’s fleet could
carry mines as part of their standard armament.” In addition, all newly purchased naval equipment from Russia,
including the Kilo-class submarines and
the Sovremenny-class destroyers, “have
integral minelaying capabilities.” Such
capabilities may soon grow beyond the
point where the U.S. Navy and its Asian
allies can easily counter them.
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Although the Chinese navy still exhibits
serious vulnerabilities, especially in air
defenses, air forces, and electronic systems, concerted efforts are under way
to correct these problems. In addition,
should Beijing ever focus its land and
sea forces either on mainland Asia or
any of the thousand offshore islands,
the “PLA’s assault forces could also
prove overwhelming in battles for islands in the South China Sea, and perhaps for attacks on more distant islands
as well. China, in other words, is well
equipped to use land forces as part of a
joint maritime strategy.”
Lim and Kane have approached this
question from different angles—one
from the field of geopolitics and the
other from strategy—but they agree
that the PRC’s future ambitions most
likely include the construction of a
blue-water navy. Until that navy is
complete, China cannot hope to fight
and win a war at sea, especially against a
force as large and sophisticated as the
U.S. Navy. However, as Kane aptly suggests, a naval victory may not be part of
China’s grand strategy, since Beijing
“has reason to hope that it has found
limits to Washington’s willingness to
intervene.” So long as China keeps its
strategic goals small, it may succeed in
making incremental gains unopposed.
It is perhaps because of this threat of
incremental gains that Lim warns, “The
need to establish a stable power equilibrium in East Asia is an imperative of international security that the United
States cannot afford to ignore.”
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College
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Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam
in Central Asia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.
Press, 2002. 281pp. $24

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, U.S. policy makers focused
heavily on Central Asian states as venues for basing troops and equipment
for the war on terrorism. Although that
war initially focused on Afghanistan,
the effects of militant Islam have also
affected various states in the Central
Asian region to the north. In this book,
Rashid provides the reader with a journalist’s account of what has led to the
rise of militant Islam in Central Asia.
This book had just gone into editing
when the attacks on the World Trade
Center towers and the Pentagon occurred, and it underwent revision
shortly before publication.
Rashid served as the chief correspondent for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Central Asia at the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Daily Telegraph
for several years. His books and articles
have made him one of the most respected observers of events in the region. His previous book, Taliban, won
him worldwide acclaim and became a
best-seller after 9/11 for its explanation
of the rise of the Taliban.
Rashid begins by providing historical
background. He points out that due to
its geographic location, Central Asia has
historically been the setting of numerous conquests, great-power struggles,
significant economic activity, literary
and artistic developments, and discussions about Islamic philosophy. Some
of these themes still resonate today.
The struggle between Russia and Great
Britain in the late nineteenth century
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saw major Central Asian khanates (territories), such as Bukhara, Samarkand,
and Tashkent, fall under Russian influence. This influence continued into the
Soviet era despite attempts by Central
Asian territories to forge autonomy. By
appealing to Islam in various combinations with nationalism, ethnic identity,
and ideology, Muslim intellectuals and
clerics in Central Asia initially tried to
find common ground with the Bolshevik government. Unfortunately, all
overt symbols of Islam were ultimately
suppressed, and the religion went underground during Soviet times.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Islam underwent a rebirth in Central
Asia, according to Rashid. However,
most of the region’s new leaders were
former Communist Party officials
turned nationalists who were mainly
concerned about maintaining order
and preventing the infiltration of militant Islamists. The civil war in Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban, and the
presence of al-Qa‘ida fed these objectives. Furthermore, the new Central
Asian rulers have been unable to improve the economic condition of the
people. Rashid observes that among
other factors, a combination of abject
poverty, authoritarian rule, and the
skepticism of Central Asian leaders
about even peaceful manifestations of
Islam have led to the rise of militant
groups throughout the region.
The author uses three examples to illustrate his points: the Islamic Renaissance
Party in Tajikistan, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir
in several Central Asian states, and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Each
of these, although in itself unique, owes
its prominence to the reasons outlined
above. Rashid also discusses the situation of great-power rivalry among the

9

Naval War College Review, Vol. 57 [2004], No. 1, Art. 18
144

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The author ends with a chapter that
highlights the issues contributing to
Central Asia’s woeful situation and
offers some thoughts about forging stability there. This latter portion is disappointingly short; Rashid devotes only
nine pages to discussing possible solutions to alleviating Central Asia’s plight.
A more developed discussion would
have been beneficial.

security policy focus “on oil field protection, the defense of maritime trade
routes, and other aspects of resource
security.” This position represents a
reaffirmation of the industrial and economic dimensions of U.S. national security. In effect, if Klare is right, we are
witnessing a resurgence of a materialist
strand of American strategic thought
that has been prominent at least since
Alfred Thayer Mahan. For strategists,
neither the clash of civilizations, the
tragedies of identity politics, nor the
long-buried animosities of religion or
ethnicity are sufficient motivations for
the major sources of conflict in the
modern world. Rather, conflicts and
national security policies are about the
struggle for natural resources.

Aside from this flaw, Jihad provides an
excellent overview of the reasons for the
rise of militant elements in Central Asia.
The book gives an understanding of the
stakes involved in Central Asia’s security
and how the region applies to U.S. interests. Central Asia has become significant
for U.S. interests not only because of the
prospects for oil but also for its potential
as a haven for terrorist bases.

Lest anyone think that this is a purely
American phenomenon, Klare suggests
that the “economization” of international security affairs holds not just for
the United States but also for most
countries, including China, Japan, and
Russia. Insatiable consumption coupled
with finite, poorly distributed resources,
as well as with a propensity to use armed
force, leads to a conflict-ridden future.

United States, China, and Russia as it
relates to oil pipelines and regional stability. He also goes into detail regarding
neighboring states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and
their respective agendas toward the region. These chapters round out a complete picture of all the factors affecting
Central Asia’s stability.

AMER LATIF

Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia

Klare, Michael T. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry Holt,
2002. 304pp. $15

Michael Klare argues that most wars of
the future, like many of those of the
past and present, will be caused by conflicts over natural resources, especially
oil and water. As a consequence, he
suggests that American national

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/18

Much of Klare’s argument reads as if it
were inspired by the tumultuous events
of the 1970s, specifically after the first
global oil shock helped to alert the
world to upcoming neo-Malthusian dilemmas. The 1973–74 oil crisis, among
other events, forced the United States
and the world to face the reality that petroleum supplies are finite, poorly distributed across the globe, and vulnerable
to rogue states. Academics and policy
entrepreneurs then spent much of the
decade cataloguing the vast number of
critically important natural resources
that were in short supply or projected to
be, given consumption trends and
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demographic growth. Klare continues to
assume that resource shortages lie in
wait for humanity as a whole and for
specific societies in particular.
Unfortunately, Klare barely pauses to
consider the possibility that diplomatic,
economic, and political developments
might ease potential resource conflicts
before they escalate into armed conflicts. After all, countries fighting over
access to water or oil could simply negotiate arrangements or allow market
forces to dictate outcomes; the author
himself notes examples and cases where
diplomatic solutions have succeeded in
the past. In fact, the absence of economic reasoning in this book is startling. After all, economists from cranks
to countless mainstream professionals
have demonstrated how market forces
can help manage the worst aspects of
resource shortages. Thus energy shortages that lead to price increases in turn
encourage consumers to conserve; consumption is reduced, as well as overall
dependence. Hence, despite tremendous economic growth, Western Europe, Japan, and even the United States
have become much more energy efficient since the oil shock of the 1970s.
Substitution effects are also possible, although perhaps not for a resource as
fundamental and elemental as water.
This book is less than persuasive on the
topic of politics. In its final section,
which describes alternatives to war,
Klare sets up a straw man, arguing that
“it seems reasonable to ask whether a
resource-acquisition strategy based on
global cooperation rather than recurring conflict might not prove more effective than guaranteeing access to
critical supply over the long run.” He
then answers his own question by
claiming that “such a strategy would
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call for the equitable distribution of the
world’s existing resource stockpiles in
times of acute scarcity.” In short, Klare
suggests a utopian solution to a deeply
practical set of problems. It is more
likely that many, if not most, of the various potential resource “wars” outlined
here will be settled short of war (or at
least of a major war) by various methods
of muddling through. Grand bargains
over potentially equitable distributions
of various resources seem unlikely given
the present state of international politics.
Even if one accepts Klare’s dire assumptions about the possibility of shortages
and conflicts, his list is very traditional.
Oil and water conflicts are old news. He
does not mention the possibility of new
competitions, for resources like satellite
“parking spaces” or access to ocean
fisheries, that might lead to clashes
among great powers. Nor does he explore in great detail demographic realities that underlie competition for water
and energy. For many of the water conflicts, for example, the key variable is
tremendous population growth, which
makes old agreements obsolete and intensifies bargaining over future
resources.
Criticisms aside, Resource Wars offers
readers a great deal. Klare provides
thumbnail summaries of numerous
conflicts great and small, from the
South China Sea to the headwaters of
the Nile. He represents each case with
grace and economy. He reminds us of
the oft-forgotten histories and details of
geography that matter greatly in resource wars. More importantly, Klare
provides a useful corrective to the
ideational, historical, and political explanations of international behavior so
popular today. Even the Arab-Israeli
conflict is linked to competition for
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land and water in ways that some who
focus on the religious conflicts, the
shadow of the past, and the various
weaknesses of the Israeli-Palestinian
and other Arab authority structures forget. In short, academics, policy makers,
and military officers should pay close
attention to those regions that have the
greatest potential for armed conflict
based on the relative scarce supplies of
critical resources.
PETER DOMBROWSKI

Naval War College

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Age of
Sacred Terror. New York: Random House, 2002.
490pp. $25.95

Were you to begin with the last chapter
of this book, “A World of Terror,” you
would note that radical Islamists do not
have an exclusive hold on terror as a
strategic weapon. In fact, you might be
well advised to consider reading this
chapter first, to understand that extremist adherents of Christianity as well
as other faiths also have employed sacred terror as a tool in the pursuit of
their aims. If, on the other hand, you
choose to begin with chapter 1, you will
receive a good overview of the terrorist
events of the past ten to twelve years,
with a focus on those of Islamic origin.
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
senior staff members of the Clinton
administration’s National Security
Council, paint a coherent picture of the
genesis of sacred terror, the response to
it, and prospects for the future. The
time frame also includes the end and
the beginning of the two Bush administrations. Benjamin and Simon’s conclusion points out the long-term nature of
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the issue and recommends that the
West engage it with a view to the
postconflict possibilities. The book’s
purpose may include an attempt to influence history’s interpretation of the
data, particularly with regard to the
years of the authors’ involvement, but
that hardly negates its significance.
Benjamin and Simon offer three particularly valuable discussions. First, they
carefully tease three threads from the
history of radical Islamism. Second,
they give an airing to the workings of
government—probably always less than
transparent. In this, they do not hesitate
to parcel out responsibility for good
and for ill. Finally, they offer a strategic
reflection that goes beyond radical
Islamism.
That Islam was, and can be, a religion
of the sword should come as no surprise. After Muhammad (d. 632), Taqi
al-Din ibn Taymiyya, born in 1269, an
accomplished Islamic jurist at age
twenty, established the intellectual underpinning of today’s radical Islamism.
Ibn Taymiyya did more than anyone to
erect jihad—actual warfare—as a pillar
of Islam. From him descended in the
subsequent centuries serious intellectuals, hard men ready to commit violence, messianic figures whose zeal
seems most foreign to twenty-firstcentury realities. Together, “they feed
into the eruption of jihadist Islamism
that has confronted the West, America
in particular, over the last decade.”
Now, the warrior prince Usama bin
Laden carries jihadism into the new
millennium.
“Exactly when the name Usama bin
Laden began appearing in American intelligence reports and FBI investigative
materials is something we are unlikely
to ever learn.” This observation,
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coupled with the truism that we judge
the unknown to be unlikely, points out
how it was that we only gradually gave
shape and definition to the terrorist
threat. When one considers that the
United States was riding the laurels of
the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War and that
its economy was steaming comfortably,
it seems almost understandable that no
one put all the pieces together earlier.
Nevertheless, Benjamin and Simon take
turns putting agencies and leaders in
the pillory. Interagency collaboration is
mostly a game of “I’ve got a secret.” Alley politics overshadow intelligent analysis and policy making as the White
House and Capitol Hill threw punches
at each other; a president lacked personal credibility; and the news media,
aware of the public’s low interest for international news, failed to pursue stories aggressively.
Before 9/11, “America was the prisoner
of an old paradigm for thinking about
terrorism, and it could be released only
through a revolutionary act of violence.” Herein lies a tragic blessing. As
its long-range response, the administration created a new cabinet-level department for homeland security. Other
measures were also taken, and others
need to be taken once the technology
measures up. Additionally, citizens and
governments alike must become much
more attuned to the various currents
that have been shaped by the past and
that will shape the future. Developing a
sustainable strategy depends on it, lest
the tragedy become pathos.
The book concludes with a riveting
chapter on terrorism under the cloak of
other religions. Jewish messianism, the
quasi-Buddhist cult Aum Shinrikyo,
and Christian apocalyptic literature and
movements all point to more terrorism.
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The Age of Sacred Terror will enlighten
leaders and citizens alike, and it should
be a must-read for midlevel officers, especially those aspiring to senior leadership. It challenges the way we plan and
train, and it certainly provides grist for
the mill of doctrine development—
while pointing out, yet again, that this
is not the foe our parents and grandparents faced. If we learn no other lesson,
this book will have served us well.
S. DOUGLAS SMITH

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Kurspahic, Kemal. Prime Time Crime: Balkan
Media in War and Peace. Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003.
261pp. $19.95

Solving the puzzle of the destruction of
Yugoslavia is one of the dominant historical and political questions of our
time. Prominent scholars, high-ranking
military officers, and noted politicians
all seem to be asking how an advanced
confederation could fail so quickly and
with such disastrous consequences.
Kemel Kurspahic, the award-winning
editor of the Sarajevo wartime daily
newspaper Oslobodjenje, provides some
important answers to this question with
his firsthand account of media in the
former Yugoslavia.
This book provides chilling, first-person
insight into the decline of the Yugoslavian media into nationalism and into
its contribution to the destruction of
the Yugoslav federation. Kurspahic, a
Bosnian Muslim, paints a picture of the
disintegration of the former republic
that, like many horror stories, is at once
riveting, revolting, and compelling.
This is a work that is riveting in its
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honesty, revolting in its facts, and ultimately compelling in its insight. The
author’s journalistic style easily dissolves the complexity of politics and
personality, offering the reader a valuable glimpse into a political arena rarely
seen, much less understood, by Westerners unfamiliar with the Balkans.
The first chapter’s treatise on the author’s thoughts and beliefs concerning
journalism during Josip Broz Tito’s socialist revolution evokes an optimism
shared by many Yugoslavs during the
days of the “Balkan miracle.” This optimism offers a starting point for the
reader’s compassion for the people of
the former Yugoslavia and their lost
dream. Many readers will find here an
illuminating perspective on the lost
opportunities during Tito’s regime—a
time of great hope for unity but ultimate belief in nationalism, ethnicity,
and culture.
The importance of ethnicity became excruciatingly clear during the early
1990s, when, as the author describes,
the nationalist parties and leaders in
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia managed to
capture the press. Playing on themes
and seams between cultures that had
been glossed over by Tito’s press,
journalists began an easy decline into
uncontested nationalist rhetoric. According to Kurspahic, “the Yugoslav
public . . . still had only one ruling
party and its ideology. What was once a
Communist controlled media became a
nationalist-controlled media. Milosevic
simply renamed his party—from Communist to Socialist—and switched . . .
from ‘brotherhood and unity’ to ‘hatred
toward neighbors.’” These divisions
provided stronger focal points for the
parties and easier writing for the media,
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and they reinforced the nationalist bias
of the people.
Not limiting his comments to Serbia,
Kurspahic thoroughly examines the
slide of Croatian and Bosnian media
into nationalist propaganda as well. He
paints a consistent theme of one-party
rule and its ability to control and focus
the press. The press, responding to the
call of nationalism, simply followed the
path it always had—support of the
party in power.
This point leads to an exceptionally
compelling aspect of the narrative, the
rise and suppression of the opposition
media. Kurspahic exhaustively categorizes attempts in each republic to combat the rampant nationalism. Most of
the attempts by a critical press to establish itself, regardless of location, met
disastrous ends. The work’s firsthand
accounts of resistance to nationalism
and its effects offer remarkable insights
into journalistic ethics and the strength
they offer editors and reporters, even at
the threat of their own lives. The decisions made to crush the opposition
press provide more chilling evidence of
the strength of nationalism as a political
tool of control.
However, the work’s concern is not the
pathos of the opposition and its attempt at critique but its inability to alter the ethnic momentum of the
warring republics. Kurspahic’s contribution to an understanding of the war
is his argument regarding the willingness of the people to accept the crimes
of its leaders as a natural part of the progression to statehood. This was the true
media disaster in the former Yugoslavia.
In the eyes of the author, the media’s
crime was its unchallenged, biased, and
willing complicity with nationalist
rhetoric.
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The author’s attempt to weave a
straight course through the warfare of
three ethnicities suffers from a few
shortcomings. As the author seeks to
produce history, there is a great deal of
personal recollection. If the author is
attempting an autobiography, there is a
great deal of history. Some might say
his own ethnic identity prevents a balanced account of Serb or Croatian media. Kurspahic understands this; his
damning indictment of his own country’s media and how Bosnian nationalism translated into violence speaks for
itself. Nevertheless, the author also accepts the necessity to play the ethnic
card and laments that Oslobodjenje’s
“selected editing” in Sarajevo was necessary for its survival.
Concluding with the current changes in
the Balkan media and a list of future
policy options to prevent media nationalism, Kurspahic returns to the optimistic tone of the beginning of the
work. Reviewing the policy recommendations of the last chapter, Kurspahic
yearns for a free and independent press,
one worthy of, and desiring, outside critique. The author would also welcome a
press that challenges the government.
This optimism, though warranted, may
be premature. It remains to be seen if
international media-watchdog groups
can bring about any of these changes.
Prime Time Crime commands an important place on the bookshelf of anyone studying the former Yugoslavia.
Kemal Kurspahic trains an unblinking
eye on the nationalist Balkan press and
its contribution to the war. In particular, the first chapter and the appendices
should be required reading for any officer posted to duty in this troubled region. Although addressing just one
small piece of the puzzle that was the

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004

149

fall of Yugoslavia, Kurspahic’s narrative
of the rise of a nationalist press answers
many questions about the society of
former Yugoslavia, its destruction, and
its ability to prosecute such a horrendous conflict. In a much broader sense,
Prime Time Crime reveals what may happen when any government, political
leader, or nationalist ideal captures or
co-opts the media.
CLEMSON G. TURREGANO

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Kennedy, Gregory C., and Keith Neilson, eds.
Military Education: Past, Present, and Future.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 256pp. $64.99

This collection of ten essays is largely
historical. Only three deal with current
military education, and none focuses
substantially on the future. Six examine
European institutions, while three address military education in the United
States and one recent change in Canada. The editors and authors are seasoned historians; some teach at civilian
institutions, some at military schools.
The essays report the continuing tension between academic officerpreparation and hands-on experience,
and the contrast of both approaches
with the military’s more usual method
of preparation—training. All agree that
technology and its continued development mean education is required. History
is agreed to be crucial to military education, but there are critiques here of how it
is used and of its tendency to direct
attention to the past rather than to consider the past’s meaning for the future.
T. G. Otte discusses the influence of
the French Revolution and German
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philosophy on von Clausewitz’s discussion of the development and value of
leaders with “genius.” Dennis E.
Showalter describes the evolution of
Prussian military education in the direction of merit criteria for officer selection and the resulting increase in the
number of officers who were commoners. Lori Bogle of the U.S. Naval Academy then addresses how Prussian
lessons were applied at the Military
Academy at West Point by Sylvanus
Thayer, superintendent from 1817 to
1833. She describes his emphasis on
moral education, which included religious revivals and rigorous mental and
physical discipline. Equality, honor,
competition, and formal training in
ethics were all part of Thayer’s efforts to
tame what Bogle calls “boy culture” and
its individualistic definition of personal
honor—characteristic of the antebellum American South—in terms that entailed military obedience.
Several essays consider British military
education. Andrew Lambert notes that
militaries believe experience is crucial,
but in fact many officers do not actually
have experience, so academics are important. Academics, he says, should
stimulate real thinking, but too often
that comes only after military defeat.
Further, the “edge” provided by critical
thinking is too often of short duration.
Lambert argues that selection for intellectual prowess and assignments to
posts that use prowess is all-important
and that poor leadership leads to setbacks. One example of poor leadership,
he says, was that of First Lord Winston
Churchill, “who would not listen to advice.” David French discusses officer
training in the regular British army between the two world wars. A not entirely successful effort was made to
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broaden the social class of officers,
broaden their education, expand their
view beyond that of the regiment, recruit officers with university degrees,
and promote by examination as opposed to primarily by seniority. A
weakness of officer education that appeared in the early years of World War
II was its lack of training in “all-arms
cooperation.”
Mark R. Grandstaff gets to tell the story
of the founding of the U.S. Air War
College in the heady days of the newly
created service after World War II. Its
motto? “Unhampered by Tradition”; its
education was to be “prewar not postwar.” One goal was to develop military
strategists, but from the beginning
there were also some who argued that
the purpose was to develop “air statesmen” who could “stand up to the politicos” and gain a “full share in the
formulation of national policies.”
Grandstaff credits the Air War College
with excellent methodology but finds
the value of its educational content
variable. He does not consider how
method, in fact, affects content.
The one important change in U.S. military education since Vietnam has been
the emphasis given to joint education.
This shift was imposed by Congress.
Thomas A. Keany details the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s
requirements, noting an assumption that
education on jointness can occur only in
a joint environment and arguing that
emphasis on campaigns diminishes the
attention given to the many other ways
in which the services should be cooperating. Ronald G. Haycock explores another example of civilian intervention,
recounting Canadian changes since its
military’s “Last Traumatic Experience.”
(Canadian troops murdered a Somalian

16

War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS

teen in 1993.) The National Defense College was closed, officers were required to
get college degrees, the content of their
education was greatly expanded, and the
publication of a new college journal was
ordered. Haycock’s essay on the changes
and their potential should be required
reading as Canada endeavors to find its
way out of the “colonial cringe” through
emphasized tactics and technology.
In his overview of current European
military education, Peter Foot describes
three types that exist today: “Jena”
schools, which look to professional,
in-house education; “Falkland” schools,
which “bolt on” new material; and
“Kosovo” schools, which address complexity and ambiguity and seek external, civilian accreditation. Foot notes a
trend toward commonality, including
more joint and combined training and
advanced distance learning. He gives
particular attention to military training
in Eastern Europe, noting in particular
developments in Bulgaria and in the
Baltic republics’ tristate institution.
In all, this is a collection worth reading, especially to remind us of the impediments to change and the perpetual
tension between training and education (within its critical thinking), between tradition and innovation, and
between technology and strategy. The
debate over military education began
as early as Plato, and it will not end
with Kennedy or Neilson.
JUDITH STIEHM

Florida International University

Hackworth, David H., and Eilys England. Steel My
Soldiers’ Hearts. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2002. 444pp. $27.95
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There are so many books about the
Vietnam War and the Vietnam experience that the message of one more risks
being lost amidst a vast ocean of tragic
tales told with great pain. However,
Hackworth and England have provided
something more than a reminiscence of
an Army combat unit in the post–Tet
Offensive world of Vietnam; they have
presented readers with a tactical reform
primer for infantry. All the information
is there in stark GI English, beginning
with the first sentence of chapter 1 (not
repeated here out of delicacy), and finishing up with the last sentences of the
last chapter: “We now need to fight
smart as much as we need to get even.
There is no other choice. We do it right
or we lose. We win—or we die.”
Hackworth and England are referring
to the new war against terrorism in the
post-9/11 world. The quotation applies
to the current day, and it applied to
Hackworth’s nightmare battalion in the
Mekong Delta in 1969.
His unit was the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The troops making up the
battalion were, as the authors state, citizen draftee soldiers, not the volunteers
that had filled the first combat units
that went into Vietnam back in 1965.
These soldiers did not want to be in
Vietnam. They had come from a country where protests against the war had
become large-scale performance art,
widely publicized by news media and,
most importantly, were supported by a
large portion of the population. These
reluctant warriors were doubly cursed,
for they were part of an army the leadership of which had started to unravel
in the face of the stubborn refusal of an
enemy to admit defeat, an enemy who
still could attack U.S. soldiers with skill,
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speed, and lethality. Hackworth and
England are unsparing in their depictions of the martinets and incompetents
who made up a fair portion of the officer and noncommissioned officers’
corps that led soldiers into the Delta
swamps and rice paddies—beginning
with the battalion commander who
places his unit’s main base in the middle of a Viet Cong minefield, through a
commanding general more focused on
maximizing body counts for his own
career than on effectively fighting an
elusive enemy.
Despite determined opposition both
from the enemy and higher headquarters, Hackworth achieved an organizational transformation of his hard-luck
battalion. The 4/39th became a skilled,
deadly foe of the Viet Cong in the
Delta, a unit that took the fight to the
enemy, taking away his initiative.
Hackworth did this through reimposition of a strict but fair discipline, introduction of and training in proven and
successful fieldcraft, and leadership
from the front. There are no magic bullets or technological fixes for this kind
of transformation, just simple success
on the battlefield—the enemy dies or
goes away. In the beginning of his command, Hackworth’s disciplinarian approach earned him a contract on his
head from his own soldiers. By the time
he left, one of these same soldiers
would write, “The most terrible thing
happened today. Colonel Hackworth
left. You remember the one everyone
hated, and wanted shot? Now there’s
another bounty out for him—to anyone
who can get him back.”
Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts contains the
collected practical wisdom of this successful battalion commander. Curiously, however, the wisdom that keeps
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soldiers alive on the battlefield does not
necessarily contribute to the end of battles or wars. Hackworth and England
acknowledge as much in an account of
a conversation between Hackworth and
John Paul Vann. Hackworth and Vann
were compatriots and friends; Vann
had been Hackworth’s company commander in Korea. Vann, now a civilian
advisor to the South Vietnamese regime, told Hackworth that while his
battalion was improving the security of
the area, they were killing too many civilians. Vann added, “Once the 9th’s
out of here, I reckon that eighty to
ninety percent of the Delta’s population
will come to our side. You guys have
been the VC’s biggest recruiter. You kill
a boy’s mama, which side do you
reckon he’ll join?”
Therein lies the major lesson of this
frank, valuable book. A nation’s armed
forces can be exceptionally well trained,
exceptionally lethal, and full of esprit de
corps. They can win all the battles. They
can maximize the body count. But if the
end of the battle or war is flawed—or
worse, uncertain—no amount of courage, steel, or personal battlefield leadership will have obtained victory.
JON CZARNECKI

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the
CIA and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.
441pp. $27

That the United States has conducted a
program of high-altitude and spaceborne photographic reconnaissance
since the mid-1950s is hardly a secret.
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With the public release of many previously classified source documents and
project histories, the time is right for
Philip Taubman’s history of the strategic issues, politics, personalities, and
technologies that drove the development of America’s extraordinary space
reconnaissance capability.
Taubman has reported on national security and intelligence matters for the New
York Times for more than twenty years.
He is clearly a thorough researcher; his
list of consulted sources, documents,
and technical reports runs to eighteen
pages of small print. Much of it is material new to the public domain.
Strange as it may seem today, when the
United States is rich in strategic intelligence, in the early 1950s it had no reliable estimate of the numbers of
strategic bombers, missiles, or nuclear
warheads in the Soviet Union. As
Winston Churchill said, the USSR was
“a riddle wrapped in an enigma.” Bison
bombers flew circles around Moscow to
inflate the estimates of Western air
attachés of their numbers; Nikita
Khrushchev rattled rockets to add to
the noise.
In this murky but threatening environment, the Eisenhower administration
was struggling to develop a balanced
defense policy, one that would offer effective defense against an opponent
whose capabilities and intentions were
imperfectly known, but one that would
not break the nation’s economy. Hard
strategic intelligence—reconnaissancebased counts of strategic things—was
key. However, the Soviet Union was
then what was picturesquely called “a
denied area.” RB-47s and similar aircraft probed the borders but could not
see deeply into the Soviet Union, and
their reconnaissance flights often ended
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in political embarrassment for the government and tragedy for the crews.
At this point, a collection of remarkable
men entered the game: Edwin Land of
Polaroid, a politically well connected
systems engineer; Kelly Johnson, head
of Lockheed’s fabled “Skunk Works”
and builder of extraordinary aircraft;
James Baker of Harvard, a most creative
camera-system designer; and Arthur
Lundhal of the CIA, a gifted photographic interpreter. Richard Bissell, the
CIA’s legendary manager of high-risk
projects, assumed the leadership of this
gang and with it brought the fabled U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
and later the first photographic reconnaissance satellites, Corona, to operational fulfillment.
Taubman paints these men unreservedly as patriots, putting their considerable technical skills and imagination at
their country’s service. That they were.
More importantly, they grasped the
need for hard strategic intelligence and
had the perspective to see the promise
of new technologies and their application to the problem of strategic
reconnaissance.
The author does a splendid job of interpreting the significance of the technical
problems encountered and the brilliant
ingenuity of the solutions. Aircraft had
never operated at the combination of
altitude (over seventy thousand feet)
and range (beyond three thousand
miles) that strategic overflight of the
Soviet Union would require. The solution from Johnson’s Skunk Works was
the U-2, a sort of jet-powered glider
with the climb characteristics of a
homesick angel. Baker designed cameras with long focal lengths that folded
into tight fuselage and satellite spaces;
Kodak developed films that could
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survive the temperature extremes encountered at reconnaissance altitudes;
Lundhal organized a photographic
interpretation activity to receive and
analyze the pictures.
When satellite-borne cameras replaced
the U-2, new and even more demanding technical problems arose. Just getting a satellite launched and into orbit
was no mean trick. Choosing between
relaying television pictures from space
or returning exposed film was a subtle
and demanding technical choice. Recovery of the exposed film was selected
and became the coolest trick of all: film
capsules, ejected from the satellite, reentered the atmosphere and parachuted
down to where a specially equipped
C-130 snagged them out of the air.
All this seems quite ordinary today, but
in the 1950s these were innovative
technical accomplishments. Too often
strategic histories treat critical technical
accomplishments lightly and gloss over
their significance to strategic and policy
choices. To Taubman’s credit, he is attuned to the importance of the enabling
technologies and brings their role and
impact to the reader’s understanding.
After getting the cameras aloft,
Taubman turns his attention to the
consequences of the pictures they returned. The first flights captured staggering numbers of detailed pictures
covering vast sweeps of the hidden interior of the Soviet Union. The pictures
revealed that Soviet Bison bombers
were as rare as the animal is today in
Montana and that Soviet intercontinental missiles, while large and ugly, were
few and in a low state of readiness.
This did not end the Cold War or put
America completely at ease, but it did
bring some balance and scope to
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defense planning for the late 1950s. In
1960 a presidential candidate who
should be remembered for better things
rode to victory partly on claims that the
Eisenhower administration had allowed
a dangerous missile gap to grow. The
pictures from these satellites and aircraft put paid to that.
Taubman’s book is twice valuable—
first, for its historical development of
the value and impact of strategic intelligence, and second, for its insight into
the role of technology and technologists
in shaping strategic policy.
In his final pages, Taubman raises important questions about America’s current reliance on technical intelligence
collection methods. He notes that little
about al-Qa‘ida’s activities or capabilities is being revealed or forecast by satellite reconnaissance and that human
intelligence sources and the collection
of intelligence must play a central role
in the twenty-first-century war against
terrorism.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE

Edgartown, Massachusetts

Bonds, John Bledsoe. Bipartisan Strategy: Selling
the Marshall Plan. Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2002. 256pp. $64.95

When we look back on great historical
events, we often ascribe an inevitability
to things that were, in fact, anything but.
In this lucid and comprehensive study of
the formulation and enactment of the
Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how
this great pillar of American post–World
War II policy was anything but inevitable. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S.
Navy and professor of history at the
Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,
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concludes his penultimate chapter on
the final legislative approval of what
was to be Public Law 793 with the
words: “So it was finally done. The
country had made a significant commitment to Europe and to internationalism in general, consciously and with
conviction, despite some difficult
holdouts like Mr. John Taber, Chairman, House Appropriations Committee. But to the last the issue had been in
doubt.” On that last sentence (emphasis
added) hangs the tale of this study.
The Republicans controlled Congress,
the president was seen as weak and was
opposed by prominent members of his
own party, and the Republicans smelled
a White House victory in 1948, for the
first time since 1928. On partisan
grounds alone, then, 1947–48 did not
seem a propitious time for a major bipartisan initiative. Beyond considerations of party, however, there were
large substantive policy issues that divided the nation: how best to deal with
the erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union; fear
of inflation and the ultimate cost of European recovery; concern for balancing
the budget; and how to meet the public
desire for “normalcy” after years of depression and war.
Bonds gives an impressive account of the
extraordinary skill of the Truman administration and the rightly celebrated
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in
mobilizing business, labor, intellectuals, and public opinion in support of
what many correctly perceived as a decisive break with traditional American
foreign policy. In this mobilization of
external opinion and lobbying of congressional support (at a time when such
lobbying was seen as improper), there
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were mutually countervailing pressures
tending to minimize President Truman’s
public engagement, which was seen as
raising partisan hackles, but also to maximize the president’s public role, the
better to position him for the 1948 election. Bonds correctly concludes, however, that such considerations and skills
were insufficient to account for the final
enactment.
A fundamental change of perspective
was required, and skillful alliance building and sales strategies were inadequate.
Indeed, the administration understood
this and sought to justify the shift in
American peacetime engagement by the
need to restore the European balance of
power and the international trading
system, ravaged by depression and war.
At the same time, there was a desire to
establish for the first time in American
history a program of universal military
training. In the mind of the president,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
and Secretary of Defense James V.
Forrestal, the European Recovery Program and a new foundation for national
defense were inextricably linked.
In the event, none of these arguments,
or the general campaign to weld an alliance of business, labor, academia, and
the public in support of America’s new
role, generated sufficient votes in Congress to pass the Marshall Plan. Soviet
actions in Finland, Czechoslovakia, and
Berlin did.
All of this is particularly remarkable in
view of the fact that the administration
had consciously sought to downplay the
Soviet menace as the motive for its initiative. More abstract discussions of the
balance of power and international
commerce were consistently favored.
This stemmed from the desire neither
to slam the door on some renewed
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understanding with the Soviet Union (a
position favored by some influential
opinions in the United States) nor to create trouble for the French government,
seemingly both dependent on and threatened by the French Communist Party.
The Soviet-menace card was played on
several occasions in the unfolding debate, but in general it was subordinated
to more abstract arguments of enlightened self-interest. Moreover, it was
clear to many in the administration that
too great an emphasis on the imminence of war with Russia would scuttle
both the recovery program and universal military training in favor of a general wartime mobilization. In effect,
although Soviet pressures certainly provided the needed ingredient for legislative success, they also had the potential
to divert the country from the recovery
program itself. Later events would ultimately modify the balance between economic assistance and military
mobilization—but that is another story,
beyond the scope of this fine book.
Finally, it should be noted that Bonds
has the ability to tell a story clearly, at
times even breezily, and analyze without cumbersome jargon. For clarity and
sophistication, this is likely to be a standard reference for some time to come.
ROBERT S. WOOD

Salt Lake City, Utah

Hore, Peter, ed. Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist,
Socialist. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2003. 330pp.
$59.50

Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett was a
key member of the international circle
of scientists who led the Allied defense
research efforts of World War II, and
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he was the heart and soul of the Cold
War military-academic-industrial complex. In this book, sixteen authors attempt to shed light on Blackett’s role in
that story. The collection includes papers presented at a 1998 conference
commemorating Blackett at Cambridge
University, as well as other recent writings about him.
Not surprisingly, the compendium offers a range of perspectives on events
and issues with which Blackett was associated, rather than a comprehensive
examination of his life and work. The
articles are arranged in roughly chronological order, but there is otherwise little integration among them—a
characteristic only exacerbated by
Blackett’s wide-ranging interests and
expertise. However, it is clear that an
integrated whole was not the editor’s
goal. Instead, Hore’s intent was to augment the inadequate body of literature
on Blackett by encouraging new research
on him and publishing the results.
After an opening overview of Blackett’s
youth, compiled from Blackett’s own
autobiographical notes, the book covers his education in the Royal Navy’s
preparatory school system, his service
as a naval officer during World War I,
and his post-secondary and graduate
education in physics at Cambridge
University under the tutelage of Sir
Ernest Rutherford. After a summary of
Blackett’s contribution to Britain’s war
preparation efforts during the 1930s,
several chapters are devoted to his wartime work on defense science, technology, and policy. This material addresses
his widely acknowledged leadership in
the field of operational research and the
ways in which that research contributed
to high-level disputes over convoying
strategy and strategic-bombing policy.
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The final chapters examine the postwar
public controversy sparked by Blackett’s
vocal opposition to nuclear weapons,
his long association with Indian political leaders and scientists, a summary of
his Nobel-winning career as a physicist,
and his role in the first administration
of England’s prime minister Harold
Wilson during the late 1960s.
Hore accomplishes his goal of facilitating and gathering new research on
Blackett. Rather than introduce brazen,
new concepts, the book’s primary contribution to academic research will be
as a resource for those endeavoring to
examine elements of Blackett’s life in
the larger context. This is for the most
part a function of the biographical nature of this work, the very practical
personality of the subject, and the
large number of contributors, each
with a particular perspective. Several
of the authors, however, have focused
too intently on specific, detailed narratives, passing up the larger questions. In
some cases the focus is so narrow that
the book’s main subject—Blackett—is
conspicuous by his absence. In fact, arguably, this is the general weakness of
the book; there is so much emphasis
on Blackett’s work that little attention
is paid to Blackett himself.
The two chapters on operational research
are useful examples. Jock Gardner’s
brief contribution, “Blackett and the
Black Arts,” analyzes wartime reports
from the British signals intelligence and
operational research departments to determine the extent that the two groups
issued reports based on one another’s
data. The chapter by Richard Ormerod
is an institutional history of operational
research as a field of study, focusing on
the vagaries of the field’s attempts to
define itself. Blackett himself is rarely
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mentioned in these chapters. Given
Blackett’s central role in the history of
operational research, this would have
been the perfect opportunity to learn
more about his contributions and to
understand the influence of operational
research during and after World War II.
Fortunately, several of the contributors
chose broader topics. For example,
Peter Hore’s own chapter offers a
thoughtful look at Blackett’s experiences as a sailor during World War I,
using a variety of sources to place that
story within the wider circumstances of
the war and to consider how Blackett
weathered the ordeal. Mary Jo Nye’s
contribution, “A Physicist in the Corridors of Power,” must also be singled
out for praise. Following Blackett
throughout his entire career, Nye describes the ebb and flow of Blackett’s
influence on both national policy and
science, demonstrating how Blackett’s
career expressed his character and political beliefs. It is contributions like
these that make this work a valuable
and enjoyable book.
CHRIS ELDRIDGE

The National Academies
Washington, D.C.

Sondhaus, Lawrence. Navies of Europe. London:
Longman, 2002. 256pp. $26.95
O’Brien, Phillips Payson. Technology and Naval
Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond.
Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 360pp. $63

Since the onset of the industrial revolution, navies have continuously struggled with the challenges posed by
technological change. In Navies of Europe, Lawrence Sondaus examines this
problem from a European perspective.
Sondhaus chronicles the fortunes of
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both great and minor powers beginning
in 1815, at a time when the navies of
Europe still dominated the globe, up to
the present day.
Compressing nearly two hundred years
of naval history into a single volume is
a difficult task, but this work is a solid
introduction to the subject for the general reader. The book provides a clear
overview of the major technological developments of the modern era, including such important events as the
transition from sail to steam, the advent
of the armored warship, the dreadnought revolution, and the rise of naval
aviation. It also offers a lucid account of
naval operations during these two centuries. As might be expected, the two
world wars receive the most detailed
treatment, but the author is equally adept at recounting, and explaining the
importance of, numerous lesser-known
naval operations.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is
its attention to the navies of minor European powers, which are usually overlooked entirely in surveys of this
period. These small states were seldom
on the cutting edge of naval innovation,
but their fleets were still significant
from a national or regional perspective.
Minor powers could and did possess
navies for purposes that were often unrelated to those of their larger or more
powerful neighbors. Sondhaus never
lets these lesser navies dominate the
narrative—their inclusion sometimes
reads like an afterthought—but he consistently strikes a fair balance between
Europe’s different states.
Europe may no longer be able to dominate the world’s sea-lanes as it once did,
but this book provides a useful reminder that European naval forces,
though overshadowed by the United
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States in both resources and
capabilities, remain at the forefront of
technology and innovation, and continue to be capable of performing a
wide variety of missions on relatively
short notice.
Technology and Naval Combat in the
Twentieth Century and Beyond examines some of these same navies in
greater depth but also includes chapters
on two non-European powers, the
United States and Japan. The title,
however, is somewhat misleading. The
fifteen articles in this collection actually
pay very little attention to naval combat
during the twentieth century—nearly
all the chapters focus on peacetime naval policy, warship construction, and
technology.
It is also worth noting that not all the
states examined receive equal treatment. Italy and France drop out of the
volume after their entry into the First
World War, while Germany and Japan
disappear with the outbreak of World
War II. The United States, however,
does not appear until 1919, and the Soviet Union is included only in the section on the Cold War. Britain’s navy is
the only one to appear in all sections of
the book, and the period before World
War I is only partially covered with a
previously published article by Nicholas
Lambert on Admiral Sir John Fisher
and the concept of flotilla defense in
1904–1909.
None of this is meant as criticism, however, as the volume was clearly not intended to serve as a comprehensive
naval history of the twentieth century.
Both the general reader and the specialist will find much of interest here.
Leading scholars in the field have written the individual chapters, and the
overall quality of the contributions is
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high. The book’s highlights include insightful overviews of the U.S. and British navies during the Cold War era by
George W. Baer and Eric Grove, and a
piece on the current and future direction of the Royal Navy by Geoffrey Till.
Because the authors are able to examine
specific navies and periods in some detail, this volume illustrates more effectively than Navies of Europe the full
range of political, economic, and technological factors that typically shape a
state’s naval policy.
CHRISTOPHER BELL

Dalhousie University

Zimmermann, Warren. First Great Triumph:
How Five Americans Made Their Country a World
Power. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
2002. 562pp. $30

The path of America’s rise to global
dominance has always attracted the attention of distinguished historians and
political scientists, ranging from Henry
Adams to Walter LaFeber to Stephen E.
Ambrose. Warren Zimmermann, a
thirty-three-year veteran of the Foreign
Service, joins the fray with First Great
Triumph, a provocative analysis of the
“fathers of American imperialism” at
the onset of the twentieth century.
Zimmermann examines how President
Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, naval theorist Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Secretary of State John
Hay, and Secretary of War Elihu Root
engineered American imperial expansion in the decade from 1898 to 1908.
Why these five men? Zimmermann
claims not only that they were influential in establishing the United States as a
global power but that their characters

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2004

159

and beliefs helped determine how that
power would be used. In essence, this
book is about imperialism by “Roosevelt
and his friends.” Zimmermann also
gives due credit for constructing the
first overseas empire to Admiral George
Dewey, Leonard Wood, Philippine colonial governor William H. Taft, and
President William McKinley. Regrettably, he downplays the contributions of
Admiral Stephen B. Luce and Secretary
of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, both of
whom influenced Mahan in the development of his naval theories.
Graduates of the Naval War College
will find Zimmermann’s analysis of
Mahan’s career particularly interesting.
Zimmermann’s Mahan is the preeminent American strategist of his generation, a “pen and ink sailor” who in
midcareer found himself “out of sorts
with the navy which accurately considered him a misfit and a complainer.” At
home in Newport, Rhode Island,
Mahan articulated a doctrine of
seapower as the controlling factor to
national greatness. Like George
Kennan, who authored the containment doctrine a half-century later,
Mahan inspired American foreign policy with his insightful analysis of America’s position among nations.
The centerpiece of this work, however,
is undoubtedly Roosevelt. Roosevelt
constructed the first true imperial presidency and ushered in the “American
Century.” Fresh from his heroics during
the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt
was catapulted to the White House
upon the assassination of William
McKinley. By the time he departed
eight years later, the United States was
the dominant force in the Caribbean
and a major presence in Asia. On the
strength of his marshaling of public
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opinion and judicious use of America’s
economic and military power, Roosevelt,
not Woodrow Wilson, emerges as the
true “father of American diplomacy.”
During the Roosevelt administration,
American foreign policy combined national power with what Zimmermann
terms “high purpose.”
Zimmermann offers equally compelling
character sketches of the other members of Roosevelt’s team. Lodge emerges
as a political manipulator who guides
imperialist policies through Congress.
Hay contributes to American hegemony
in the Western Hemisphere by developing closer ties with Great Britain, while
Root creates the first American colonial
administration, in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War. Their combined efforts made their country a
power to be reckoned with on the international scene.
However, Zimmermann’s crystal ball
looks far bleaker as the United States enters the twenty-first century. Here
Zimmermann’s interpretation is based on
too much conjecture and too little fact.
Despite the massing of American military might in the Middle East in the aftermath of 11 September, Zimmermann

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss1/18

opines, this country faces an erosion of
its power due to a weakening of the
U.S. presidency and the reemergence of
congressional dominance in foreign
policy. Additionally, he sees a current
trend toward nonmilitary involvement
and an unwillingness to commit military forces in support of foreign policy.
Lastly, Zimmermann posits that international terrorism has produced a
backlash against U.S. policies as well as
the cultural, ideological, and economic
principles that guide the United States.
In summary, Zimmermann offers a
provocative interpretation about American imperialism during the last century
and a chilling prognostication for the
current one. The reader is more likely to
concur with his thesis that the expansion
of the United States to an international
power was not an aberration but a culmination of forces that had dominated
the political and economic scene since
its birth, than with the decline in the
power of the presidency, which is more
a function of personality than of the
reemergence of legislative authority.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
New Windsor, New York
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